Monday 5 November 2012

COINTELPRO Then & Now

Introduction:
 
COINTELPRO was originally initiated against the Communist Party (CP) in 1956 the program expanded to include civil rights groups and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) by the time Kennedy became president in 1961. In fact Martin Luther King Jr.'s famous “I Have a Dream” speech at the 1963 March in Washington, before Kennedy's assassination won him the FBI designation as “the most dangerous Negro in the future of this Nation.” President Johnson, while expanding the war in Vietnam and rhetorically battling the war on poverty at home, used the Black inner-city rebellions of the mid-sixties from Watts to Detroit as a pretext to issue. In August 1967, the FBI directed the covert action program code name “COINTELPRO” towards organizations which the Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups in order to disrupt and neutralize the alleged threat. The FBI memorandum expanding the program stated that its main goals were to:
 
(1)   Prevent a coalition of militant Black Nationalist groups and prevent the rise of an individual who could unify and electrify the militant nationalist movement.  (It is said that Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all fit this description.)
(2)   Prevent violence on the part of Black Nationalist groups.
(3)   Prevent militant Black Nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them.
(4)   Prevent the long-range growth of militant Black Nationalist organizations, especially among youth.
 
COINTELPRO was the brainchild of J. Edgar Hoover, the founder and director of the FBI from 1924 until his death in 1972. Shaped by the anticommunist hysteria in the aftermath of the successful Russian Revolution of 1917, Hoover took part in the Palmer Raids against radicals and spent the rest of his life in the service of espionage and undermining suspected subversives of every sort. Contemporary histories tend to focus on Hoover's maniacal egotism and closeted homosexuality to explain his lifelong fixation on repressing minorities who fought discrimination. Hoover's agenda was embraced by every president he served, including Democrats Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson.
 
Among the many targets of COINTELPRO, the most serious attention was paid to those movements that most threatened state interests. The most violent repression under COINTELPRO was used against the Black Panthers, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, the American Indian Movement, and the Puerto Rican independence movement. It was fueled by the state's need to preserve the near total political and economic disenfranchisement of people of color in the face of the first serious threats to the racial status quo since post-Civil War Reconstruction. The need of the American empire to keep Puerto Rico in its colonial orbit, while it was losing the war in Southeast Asia, drove the violent repression there and against Puerto Rican immigrants in the United States.
 
Despite the small size of the CP and the American SWP by the late 1950s and early 1960s, their members' implantation in industrial workplaces, independent electoral campaigns, desegregation, and antiwar activities as well as the bureau's fanatical obsession with communism made them targets.
New Left activists who were not only hampering the ability of the U.S. to fight in Vietnam, but also challenging ideological assumptions about women's roles, sexuality and segregation garnered attention and harassment by the state as well.
But the most disruptive and violent COINTELPRO operations in the period from the late 1960s into the mid-1970s were directed against the Black and Native American struggles. The FBI, in close collaboration with local police units (sometimes called Red Squads) used a number of techniques in its efforts to disrupt and destroy leftist groups, the most important of which are enumerated here. It was a general rule throughout the 1960s, that local police departments would devote at least 1 percent of their resources to surveillance and infiltration. These local agents partnered with their federal counter-parts, read the left-wing press and became familiar with the fact that organized leftists were involved in liberal and pacifist groups and that individuals were often radicalized by these ideas as well as by their own experiences of struggle.  The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt militant Black Nationalist organizations included groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and the Nation of Islam (NOI).
It was expressly directed against such leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokley Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammad.
 
The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original "Black Nationalist" targets. In September 1968, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as "The greatest threat to the internal security of the country”.  He also went on to say that they were "Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country. Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the United States preaching their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents, but to students in colleges, universities and high schools as well." By July 1969, the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of the program, and was ultimately the target of numerous authorized COINTELPRO actions.
 
Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI's tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could reasonably have been expected to cause violence. For example: the FBI's efforts to intensify the animosity between the BPP and the Blackstone Rangers. Tactics included, sending an anonymous letter to the gang's leader falsely informing him that the Chicago Panthers had a hit out on him. They stated that the intent of the letter was to induce the Ranger’s leader to take actions against the Panther leadership.
 
In Southern California, the FBI launched a similar covert effort to create further tension in the ranks of the BPP. This effort included mailing anonymous letters and illustrations to BPP members ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express purpose of exacerbating an existing gang war between the BPP and an organization called the United Slaves (US). This gang war resulted in the killing of four BPP members by members of the United Slaves (US) in numerous beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents during this dispute cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI, FBI officials were aware of the violent nature of the dispute which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute. They proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival factions which in the words of one FBI official resulted in shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest in the area of southeast San Diego.
 
Surveillance & violation of civil rights:
 
Numerous newspapers, black and white have written about the government's eavesdropping and infiltration of the American Communist Party. Far less is known of their COINTELPRO operations against the largest anti-Stalinist socialist organization mobilizing in the 1960s, the American Socialist Workers Party. The case of the SWP is of particular importance not only because surveillance and infiltration took place over decades, almost from its founding in 1938, but because they turned the tables on the FBI and put the Bureau on trial-and won.
 
In 1973 the SWP and its youth group the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) filed a lawsuit against the federal government (Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General) demanding compensation for years of disruption, harassment, and surveillance of the organization. Throughout the course of the discovery, trial, and other proceedings which took place over thirteen years. Detailed information about how and why the government violated the rights of lawful individuals exercising their free speech and right to organize unfolded. In a historic rebuke to the federal government's trampling on constitutionally protected dissent, Judge Griesa awarded the SWP $264,000 in damages in 1986.
 
COINTELPRO operations began against the SWP in 1961 when court records show they had around 600 members, 10 percent were FBI informants who were paid in excess of $1.6 million over the years for their efforts. Infiltration began in response to the SWP's electoral campaigns and desegregation and other legal activities. Over the years, member informants supplied the government with membership lists, financial records, budgets, minutes of meetings, mailing lists, and correspondence. From 1961-1976 fifty-five informants held offices or committee positions and fifty-one served on executive committees of the party.
 
The FBI played an active role in attempting to discredit SWP candidates for public office. An example of this was when John Franklin ran for Manhattan borough president in 1961 and when Clifton DeBerry ran for president in 1964. The two Black candidates were smeared in the press when FBI operatives sent out anonymous letters detailing minor legal transgressions from their pasts. To create friction between Black and white members, the FBI would write nasty anonymous letters containing slurs like this one supposedly written by white members to their Black vice presidential candidate in 1968 “ You and the rest of your fellow party monkeys hook up with the Black Panthers where you'd feel at home.”
 
Disruption operations were often designed to split alliances between the SWP and its antiwar and racial justice allies in movements. During a campaign to defend framed Blacks in North Carolina, the FBI sent coalition leaders phony information claiming that the SWP was stealing funds collected for the defense campaign. An FBI memorandum in 1966 explained the need to create disruption within the ranks of the SWP and to hamper the party's antiwar actions and objectives. When leading members Fred Halstead and Barry Sheppard traveled to visit troops in Vietnam, the FBI planted incendiary reports of their visit in newspapers read by GIs to encourage violence against them by troops. After the explosive protests outside the Democratic Party convention in Chicago in 1968, an anonymous letter was mailed to sixty-eight antiwar and New Left groups attacking the SWP and YSA for their cowardice in not fighting the police and warned the socialists to get out of the antiwar movement. The letter did cause a stir inside the party and made some members anxious about their involvement with New Left forces.
 
Assassinations:
 
On December 3rd 1969 the FBI launched its deadliest assault on the BPP yet. An informant who was a bodyguard of Chicago Panther leader Fred Hampton provided officials with a detailed floor plan of his home. Police raided his place and murdered Hampton in his bed and in the hail of ninety-eight rounds of bullets, Mark Clark of the Peoria Panthers was also killed. Police rounded up and beat Hampton's fiancé who was eight months' pregnant along with several others sleeping there. These victims were all charged with aggressive assault or attempted murder and held on $100,000 bail-though there were no signs of any retaliatory shots fired.
Police ransacked Panther offices from San Francisco to Indianapolis, destroyed typewriters, stole files, and ruined bulk foods stored for ghetto children's programs. Arrests and frame-ups of dozens of members cost the organization $200,000 in bail money alone. Some remain behind bars to this day, while others have spent decades harassed by law enforcement officials. It's worth noting that despite the charges of violence against the Panthers years of surveillance and infiltration never turned up hard evidence of criminal activities.
COINTELPRO Tactics included:
 
(1)   Eavesdropping: This involved not only electronic surveillance but also putting tails on people and breaking into offices and homes as well as tampering with mail. The FBI's intention was not simply to gather intelligence but making their presence known in various ways to create paranoia among activists.
(2)   Bogus mail: FBI agents would fabricate letters, ostensibly written by movement activists who spread lies and disinformation. The Bureau sent many fake letters to American Indian Movement (AIM) and Black Panther Party (BPP) leaders and activists that were designed to sow confusion and division in the ranks. The Huey Newton and Eldridge Cleaver wings of the BPP for example, were split after the FBI sent a number of manufactured letters from disgruntled party members to Cleaver. After he was exiled to Algeria, he would spend much of his time criticizing Huey Newton's leadership.
(3)   Black propaganda: The distribution of fabricated articles and leaflets that misrepresented the politics and objectives of an organization or leader in order to discredit the group or individual and to pit people and organizations against each other. 
(4)   Disinformation: The FBI often released false or misleading information to the press to discredit groups or individuals and to foster tension.
(5)   Harassment arrests: The police or FBI often arrested leaders and activists on trumped up charges in order to tie up activists in legal and court proceedings to drain their financial resources and heighten their sense of fear and paranoia.
(6)   Infiltrators or agent provocateurs: The infiltration of organizations by police agents served two purposes. One was to gather intelligence on the group. Provocateurs were used to try and encourage individuals to engage in illegal activity that could then be attributed to the group as a whole to disrupt the internal functioning of organizations and to assist in spreading of disinformation inside and outside the group.
(7)   Assassinations: There is ample evidence that FBI and related agencies played a direct role in the assassination of a number of key radical leaders.
(8)   Bad-jacketing: This refers to the practice of creating suspicion-through the spread of rumors and the manufacture of evidence on bonafide organizational members. Usually it was persons’ in key positions that were FBI/police informers.  This technique was used often against the American Indian Movement. Talented AIM activist Anna Mae Aquash for example, who was murdered on Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota in February 1976, was first subject to a successful whispering campaign initiated against her by FBI informant Doug Durham. Doug Durham, who had joined the AIM chapter in Des Moines, Iowa. Durham's role in AIM also seems to have been to encourage AIM members to engage in rash and inflammatory acts according to- author Peter Mathiessen. Durham, for example released several unauthorized memos- disseminated on organizational letterhead, indicating that AIM was preparing to launch a campaign of 'systematic violence.
(9)   Fabrication of evidence: FBI agents, police and prosecutors routinely fabricated evidence in order to obtain convictions in criminal cases against activists. A number of AIM and BPP activists including BPP leader Geronimo Pratt and AIM leader Leonard Peltier, who have been in prison for three decades for a crime he did not commit were convicted on such trumped-up evidence.
Cointelpro Today:
 
Since the attacks of Sept. 11 2001, the New York Police Department has become one of the country’s most aggressive domestic intelligence agencies.  The NYPD has been gathering vast domestic intelligence with help from the CIA. The department’s intelligence unit currently dispatches undercover officers to keep tabs on ethnic neighborhoods, sometimes in areas far outside their jurisdiction.  After the 9/11/2001 attacks a month-long investigation initiated by The Associated Press has revealed that the NYPD operates far outside its borders and targets ethnic communities in ways that would run afoul of civil liberties rules if practiced by the federal government and it does so with unprecedented help from the CIA in a partnership that has blurred the bright line between foreign and domestic spying.

The CIA inspector general opened its own investigation after a series of articles written by the Associated Press revealed how the NYPD, working in close collaboration with the CIA set up spying operations that put Muslim communities under scrutiny. Plainclothes officers known as "rakers" eavesdropped on businesses and Muslims not suspected of any wrongdoing were put in intelligence databases. In its investigation, the CIA's inspector general faulted the agency for sending an officer to New York with little oversight after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and then leaving him there too long according to officials who have read or been briefed on the inquiry. After the investigation, the CIA inspector general cleared the agency of any wrongdoing.
 
The CIA officer, Lawrence Sanchez how was the architect of the spying programs that helped make the NYPD one of the nation's most aggressive domestic intelligence agencies was cited by the inspector general for operating without sufficient supervision. Sanchez is a CIA veteran who according to his biography spent 15 years overseas in the former Soviet Union, South Asia and the Middle East. Sanchez was sent to New York to help with information sharing following the 9/11 attacks. While on the CIA payroll from 2002 to 2004 he also helped create and direct police intelligence programs.
 
 
He then formally joined the NYPD while on a leave of absence from the CIA. The loosely defined assignment strained relations with the FBI and two consecutive CIA station chiefs in New York who complained that Sanchez's presence undermined their authority. U.S. officials have acknowledged that the rules were murky but they attributed that to the desperate push for better intelligence after the attacks. Sanchez left the NYPD in 2010 and then last July the CIA sent one of its most senior clandestine operatives to work out of the NYPD.  While other internal investigation found problems with the oversight of Sanchez's assignment, officials said the rules of the current arrangement were more than clearly defined. The naturally the programs have also drawn criticism from Muslims as well as New York and Washington lawmakers.
 
 
Muslim activists even urged Police Commissioner Ray Kelly to resign and invoked the legacy of the 1960s FBI program COINTELPRO, which spied on political and activist groups. Imam Talib Abdur-Rashid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Leadership Council of New York stated "We the people find ourselves facing the specter of a 21st century COINTELPRO once again in the name of safety and security"
 
Even now the confusion remains; Police Commissioner Kelly said the new officer was working at the NYPD to help share foreign intelligence. Federal officials have said he was there on a management sabbatical and was not sharing intelligence. Kelly and the federal government also are at odds explaining the legal basis for a relationship between a local police department and the CIA which is not allowed to spy domestically. This fall, Kelly told the city council that the collaboration was authorized under a presidential order. But under those rules, the assignment would have had to have been approved by the CIA's top lawyer. The AP reported last week there was no such approval. A CIA spokeswoman, Jennifer Youngblood said Sanchez was sent to New York at the direction of then CIA Director George Tenet who had the authority to move his officers around the world to make sure intelligence was being shared. That arrangement did not require the lawyer's approval she stated: "Context matters here, the CIA stepped up cooperation with law enforcement on counterterrorism after 9/11. It's hard to imagine that anyone is suggesting this was inappropriate or unexpected."
 
The current officer, whose name remains classified, operates under a more formal arrangement that is specified in writing, states that he works directly for the NYPD. Nevertheless, some U.S. lawmakers have expressed concerns about the assignment. Even the federal government's most senior intelligence official James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence has said the arrangement looks bad and will be addressed. The CIA officer is working as a special assistant to David Cohen the NYPD's top intelligence officer. It’s unclear exactly when the CIA officer will leave the police department and what his next job will be. A former station chief in Pakistan and Jordan, he is one of the CIA's most experienced spies. His assignment in New York was expected to last a year.  The NYPD police commissioner Ray Kelly has defended his department and it’s Demographics Unit which monitors conversations in cafes and wrote reports on Muslim businesses. Kelly has said that his officers only follow leads, however internal police documents obtained by the AP show that even the most generic lead was used to justify surveillance of entire neighborhoods.
 
Officials involved in the effort also told the AP that the Demographics Unit actually avoided locations where criminal investigations were under way for fear of disrupting them. Relations between the NYPD and the Muslim community were further strained when police acknowledged that it showed nearly 1,500 officers a training video featuring Kelly. The video portrayed Muslims wanting to infiltrate and dominate the United States.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References:
 
COINTELPRO: What the (Deleted) Was It?
 
SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
 
COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program)
 
The lessons of COINTELPRO
 
Post-9/11, NYPD targets ethnic communities, partners with CIA
 
CIA helped NYPD launch spying network post-9/11 without getting proper legal approval
 
CIA report: No issue with spy agency's partnership with N.Y. police
 
NYPD Confirms CIA Employee Partnership
 
CIA To Pull Officer from NYPD after Internal Probe
 
 

US strengths, vulnerabilities & where US counterintelligence should be concentrated?


US intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative weaknesses

To effectively identify weaknesses in US intelligence collection efforts, I will use the attack on the US Marines barracks in Beirut, Lebanon as my example.  A vehicle packed with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT penetrated the security perimeter of the US Marine contingent at the Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983, crashed into the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters Building and exploded. The explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 Marines. Following this tragedy, The Secretary of Defense established a five-member commission led by Admiral Robert Long to conduct an independent inquiry of the facts and circumstances surrounding this attack. The commission noted that the Marine forces in Beirut lacked the capability to conduct tactical analysis or investigate active threats. Admiral Long’s Commission report stated, “Seldom did the US have a mechanism at its disposal which would allow a follow up on these leads and a further refinement of the information into intelligence which served for other than warnings.” In conclusion, the Commission determined that although the Marine Corps commander received numerous terrorist threat warnings before October 23, 1983, he was not provided the intelligence he needed to counter this attack. The Beirut attack clearly showed that terrorism posed a significant threat to the US and its military personnel. The inability to detect and neutralize this attack clearly demonstrated that the US Marines ability to conduct intelligence collection and analysis efforts was ineffective.

 

US strengths and capabilities

 

From what I have gathered the US strengths lie in its ability to share information with other agencies.  Increasing cooperation with other members of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community will keep the security at our borders high. The dividing line between the responsibilities of intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies must remain clear at all times. The CIA handles everything that involves foreign intelligence outside the US. The FBI and the DEA handle the law enforcement within the US. Cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement can produce fantastic success; an example of this was the arrest of the leaders of the Cali drug cartel in 1995.
 
 

This cooperation has yet to be as effective, extensive and routine as it needs to be. We should not waste valuable time worrying about bureaucratic rivalries that go back to the days of J. Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles; we have in place the interagency mechanisms that we need to address criminal and terroristic threats adequately and they should be used often. It’s time for a new approach, a new division of responsibility that realistically reflects the pattern of international activity that exists today in terrorism, crime and drugs. The Intelligence Community must learn that in these areas, the law enforcement community -- the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency and US Customs are the customers for intelligence, just as the Departments of State and Defense are the customers for intelligence in the national security arena. Intelligence and law enforcement professionals need to develop new procedures that will result in more effective cooperation. For example, intelligence and law enforcement must modify some of their most strongly held beliefs about not sharing information about their sources with each other. This does not mean that intelligence agencies will spy on US citizens. Collection activities will not infringe on the rights of US citizens. Nor will CIA or other intelligence agencies take on any law enforcement duties.  The sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement will improve the country's performance in curbing international crime, drugs and terrorism.
 

Where the US should concentrate its efforts currently

 
It is my opinion that the US should focus its effort more in the area of counterintelligence. I say this because according to the strategic threats report released by the CIA, foreign powers have seized the initiative and moved their operations to US soil, where our institutions are not constituted to work against growing foreign intelligence networks embedded within American society. In this situation, CI investigations may result in prosecutions for espionage or related offenses, demarches, or the expulsion of diplomatic personnel for activities inconsistent with their status. With the rare exception, their disposition is decided on the merits of each case at hand and not as part of a larger effort to counter the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target. As a result, I fear we have neither an adequate understanding of the foreign presence and intelligence operations in the United States nor an appreciation of their broader effects on US national security. Former deputy defense secretary John Hamre described the challenge plainly,” The goal should not be to catch the spy after he’s gotten into the country; we’ve got to stop him from entering in the first place. Perhaps we have been coming at the problem from the wrong end. Why wait until foreign intelligence activities show up on US soil, with all the operational advantages of proximity and cover that our rich society provides? There is another way. US counterintelligence could seize the strategic initiative and begin by working the target abroad with the purpose of selectively degrading the hostile foreign intelligence service and its ability to work against us. This is the central objective of strategic counterintelligence. By working the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target globally, US counterintelligence should be able to leverage insights into adversary activities and vulnerabilities to direct CI operations to maximum effect. At home, this means that the operational and analytic focus of US counterintelligence would need to be transformed from its case-driven approach to one that includes strategic assessments of adversary presence, capabilities, and intentions. This in my opinion would drive operations to neutralize the inevitable penetrations of our government and protect national security secrets and other valuable information.

 

References:

 

Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?


 

The Future of US Intelligence: Charting a Course for Change


 

Identifying Threats: Improving Intelligence & Counter Intelligence Support to Force Protection


 

The role of counterintelligence in counterterrorism


The goal of this paper is to define counterintelligence and describe its role in counterterrorism within   the intelligence community. Defining counterintelligence is somewhat problematic since no US Intelligence Agency can readily agree upon the definition of it. Counterintelligence can and is defined in both broad and narrow terms. In narrow terms, it seems that the role counterintelligence plays in combating terrorism is one that has been the subject of debate. This is not a new debate either; rather this issue appears to have surfaced as terrorism both domestic and international became a cause for greater concern to U.S. at least as early as the late 1960’s. On the other hand, the definition found in EO12333 could be interpreted more narrowly than protecting against all terrorist activities generally.
 

If one considers that the stipulation to protect against is perhaps not intended to cover all aspects of terrorism, but only sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of international terrorist activities, this means that counterintelligence has a very limited counter-terrorism responsibility. However, counterintelligence in practice seems to imply that a broader role to prevent and protect against terrorist activities beyond assassination and sabotage is the more correct view of this definition.
 

A couple of examples of this are found by observing the comments made in the recently released Report of the Joint Inquiry into the attacks of September 11, 2001.The first example concerns the FBI’s establishment of a unit specifically to deal with Islamic terrorist groups called the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU): The Radical Fundamentalist Unit was created in March 1994 to handle incidents related to international radical fundamentalist terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. This unit was also handled other counterintelligence matters and was responsible for the coordination of
extraterritorial intelligence operations and criminal investigations targeted at radical fundamentalist terrorists. In 1999, the FBI recognized the increased threat to the United States posed by Bin Ladin and created the Usama Bin Ladin Unit to handle Al-Qa’ida-related counterterrorism matters.

 

Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, it provides accurate, timely and relevant knowledge about the enemy or potential enemy and the surrounding environment. The primary objective of intelligence is to support decision making by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable level, recognizing that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible. The second intelligence objective assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence (CI). CI includes active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. CI includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion and terrorism. CI directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two intelligence objectives demonstrate that intelligence possesses positive or exploitative and protective elements. It uncovers conditions that can be exploited and simultaneously provides warning of enemy actions.

 

This intelligence provides the basis for our own actions both offensive and defensive.
The principal objective of CI is to assist with protecting friendly forces. CI is the intelligence function concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. CI enhances command security by denying an adversary information that might be used to conduct effective operations against friendly forces and to protect the command by identifying and neutralizing espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism efforts. CI provides critical intelligence support to command force protection efforts by helping identify potential threats, threat capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly operations while helping deceive the adversary as to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Physical security reduces vulnerability. Operation security reduces exposure. Combating terrorism makes us a less lucrative target. CI increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby making a significant contribution to the success of friendly operations. CI also identifies friendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures and assists with implementing appropriate security plans. The integration of intelligence, CI and counter-terrorism operations creates a cohesive unit force protection program.

 

References:

 

Impediments to effective counterintelligence and counterterrorism


 

EXPOSING THE SEAMS: THE IMPETUS FOR REFORMING U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


 

Counterintelligence


 

 

Cyberspace, CounterIntelligence’s friend & foe

The cyberspace threat:
 
Cyberspace offers great security to the perpetrator in cases involving insiders.  Although audits or similar cyber security measures may flag illegal information downloads from a corporate network, a malicious actor can quickly and safely transfer a data set once it is copied. A physical meeting is not necessary between the corrupted insider and the persons’ or organizations the information is being collected for, reducing the risk of detection. Cyberspace makes it near instantaneous to transfer enormous quantities of economic or other sensitive information. Until recently, economic espionage often required that insiders pass large volumes of physical documents to their handlers, which on the down-side created a lengthy process of collection, collation, transportation, and exploitation.
 
 
An example of physical documents leading to the discovery and arrest of spies is the case of Chinese born Dongfan Chung. Dongfan Chung was an engineer with Rockwell and Boeing who worked on the B-1 bomber, space shuttle, and other projects. He was sentenced in early 2010 to 15 years in prison for economic espionage on behalf of the Chinese aviation industry. At the time of his arrest, over 250,000 pages of sensitive documents were found in his house. This is suggestive of the volume of information Chung could have passed to his handlers between 1979 and 2006.The logistics of handling the physical volume of these documents which would fill nearly four 4-drawer filing cabinets would have required considerable attention from Chung and his handlers. With current technology, all the data in the documents hidden in Chung’s house would fit easily onto one inexpensive CD.
 
 
Offensive counterintelligence capabilities:
 
An example of offensive counterintelligence using high-technology would be the recent deployment of the sophisticated viruses known as “Flame and Stuxnet”. Stuxnet is a computer worm discovered in June 2010. Stuxnet initially spreads via Microsoft Windows, and targets Siemens industrial software and equipment. It is the first discovered malware that spies on and subverts industrial systems, and the first to include a programmable logic controller rootkit. The worm initially spreads indiscriminately, but includes a highly specialized malware payload that is designed to target only Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes.
 
 
Different variants of Stuxnet targeted five Iranian organizations, with the probable target widely suspected to be uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran; Symantec noted in August 2010 that 60% of the infected computers worldwide were in Iran.  Siemens stated on 29 November that the worm has not caused any damage to its customers, but the Iran nuclear program, which uses embargoed Siemens equipment procured secretly, has been damaged by Stuxnet. Kaspersky Lab concluded that the sophisticated attack could only have been conducted with nation-state support. This was further supported by the F-Secure's chief researcher Mikko Hypponen. It has been speculated that Israel and the United States may have been involved.
 
 
Eugene Kaspersky, the founder of Europe’s largest antivirus company, is using his company’s integral role in exposing or decrypting three computer viruses aimed at Iran to argue for an international treaty banning computer warfare. When Mr. Kaspersky discovered the Flame virus that is afflicting computers in Iran and the Middle East, he recognized it as a -technologically sophisticated virus that only a government could create. He also recognized that the virus adds weight to his warnings of the grave dangers posed by governments that manufacture and release viruses on the Internet.
 
“Cyber weapons are the most dangerous innovation of this century”. It is alleged that the United States and Israel are using the weapons to slow the nuclear bomb-making abilities of Iran; experts claim that the viruses could also be used to disrupt power grids and financial systems or even wreak havoc with military defenses. A growing array of nations and other entities are using online weapons because they are thousands of times cheaper than conventional armaments.
 
 
Dealing with the threat:
 
Today's spies practice much more sophisticated methods and employ the latest technologies to gather and transmit massive volumes of our most sensitive information on a much wider variety of targets. FISS can and do leverage distributed cyber-attacks routed through many countries using a wide variety of tactics and techniques, making it nearly impossible to state with certainty that any particular attack originated from a particular threat. Over time, computing power will completely overwhelm our ability to comprehend, let alone protect against, the exponentially expanding vulnerabilities created with new technologies. It is imperative that CI stays ahead and avoids technological surprise. 
 
The Army must quickly define the role of CI in combating the cyber intelligence threat and implement policies. Neither the U.S. Government nor its civilian experts alone can combat the terrorist and FISS cyber threat. The task of protecting U.S. information systems and other critical infrastructures requires the combined effort of the best minds of civilian industry, military, government, think-tanks, and academia. The National Infrastructure Protection Center has the responsibility to protect critical infrastructure from all threats; the current reorganization done by FBI Director Robert Mueller, is an excellent model for Department of Defense CI assets to define and implement changes needed to thwart cyber threat.
 
 
 The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command created the Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) now designated the 1st Information Operations Command to support the ground commander in information operations and information warfare (IW). The mission of 1st IO Command is broad and overarching, and often conflicts with that of other agencies providing similar services. However, the creation of LIWA and now the 1st IO Command demonstrates the migration toward a more comprehensive assessment and defense of our information systems, in which CI will play a vital role. The 1st IO Command is still in the formative stage and requires time to carve its niche in the much larger IW landscape.
 
 
References:

U.S.A. v. Dongfan "Greg" Chung on Charges of Economic Espionage
 
Stuxnet
 
Flame virus discovered in Middle East
 
Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets In Cyberspace
 
Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners
 
The new counterintelligence response to the cyber threat
 
Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders
Analysis and Observations
 

Counterintelligence, a breakdown of its laws, directives and instructions


Counterintelligence is a branch of the intelligence hierarchy which is concerned with keeping information out of the hands of foreign and domestic enemies. A number of different techniques are used to keep information safe and to generate misleading information which can be used to throw enemy agents off-track. Most nations have a government agency which supervises counterintelligence, and often several intelligence agencies have a counterintelligence branch which is separate from their regular operations.


Keeping potentially sensitive information out of enemy eyes is the most important goal of counterintelligence, and many counterintelligence agents work closely with security agents to ensure that information is secured and protected. As part of their mission, counterintelligence agencies gather information on foreign and enemy intelligence agencies, looking at their structures, methods of working, and known operatives. This information is used to exploit vulnerabilities and security holes on the enemy's side while protecting vital information.
 

In addition to protecting information, counterintelligence agencies also work to prevent subversion, assassination, sabotage, and other threats to information security and national security, using information gathered from enemy organizations to stay informed about such threats. They may also work in direct opposition to foreign operatives, performing what is known as counterespionage in an attempt to lead spies off the scent. Most counterintelligence agencies also work to deceive the enemy by planting information, making misleading plans, and so forth, in the hopes that this information will end up in the hands of the enemy, leading the enemy to make a mistake.
 

The art of counterintelligence has often been referred to as the least-known, the least-understood, and certainly among the least appreciated of all the intelligence disciplines. Surrounding and contributing to the lack of understanding of what counterintelligence can bring to the table is a well-known fact that the federal agencies which constitute the major players in the CI arena, namely the FBI, CIA, NSA and the Department of Defense, all contribute to the semantic vagaries which underpin the lack of common agreement as to what counterintelligence actually means and how it should be employed in both its defensive and offensive modes. As a result, each organization interprets and executes its -counterintelligence missions in a myriad of different ways which can significantly impair or obviate a consensus-driven definition of the term.
 

CI Laws: Exploring Executive Order 12333
 

On December 4, 1981, President Ronald Reagan enacted Executive Order 12,333, establishing the United States intelligence guidelines. Numerous restrictions were imposed on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1970s in a response to disclosures of widespread wrongdoing. Executive Order 12333 reflects the President's determination to unleash America's intelligence community from those limitations.

The Order allows the CIA, America's chief foreign intelligence gathering entity, to direct domestic counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, covert operations, and law enforcement activity against United States citizens. The drafters of the Order ignored the statutory limits on intelligence gathering activity codified in the National Security Act. Numerous amendments have been made since then.
 

Counterintelligence is an intelligence activity. Although some continue to debate this premise

Within the United States, by statute and policy, counterintelligence is an intelligence activity

And it is identified as such in the National Security Act, Executive Order, and various other directives. National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) -- as amended.
 

Basic laws governing intelligence in the United States, which specifically defines

Intelligence to include foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Executive Order 12333 -- U.S. Intelligence Activities (4 Dec 1981)

 

Executive Order 12333 Provides the U.S. Government with a clear definition of counterintelligence: “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.” [para 3.4]
 

In the table of contents, under goals (Part I) with respect to the national intelligence effort, it directs that “special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.” [para 1.1(c)] …this activity is part of counterintelligence.
 

It also directs the Intelligence Community to conduct intelligence activities necessary for “the
protection of the national security of the United States, including… collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents.” [para 1.4(c)]
 

The FBI has authority to investigate threats to the national security pursuant to presidential executive orders, attorney general authorities, and various statutory sources.

Executive Order 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) “Threats to the national security” are specifically defined to mean: international terrorism; espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the attorney general, consistent with Executive Order 12333.

 


 
Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities,"
December 4, 1981
 
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CI 101- A PRIMER
1 July 2005
By Mark L. Reagan, COL USA (Ret)