Monday 5 November 2012

The role of counterintelligence in counterterrorism


The goal of this paper is to define counterintelligence and describe its role in counterterrorism within   the intelligence community. Defining counterintelligence is somewhat problematic since no US Intelligence Agency can readily agree upon the definition of it. Counterintelligence can and is defined in both broad and narrow terms. In narrow terms, it seems that the role counterintelligence plays in combating terrorism is one that has been the subject of debate. This is not a new debate either; rather this issue appears to have surfaced as terrorism both domestic and international became a cause for greater concern to U.S. at least as early as the late 1960’s. On the other hand, the definition found in EO12333 could be interpreted more narrowly than protecting against all terrorist activities generally.
 

If one considers that the stipulation to protect against is perhaps not intended to cover all aspects of terrorism, but only sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of international terrorist activities, this means that counterintelligence has a very limited counter-terrorism responsibility. However, counterintelligence in practice seems to imply that a broader role to prevent and protect against terrorist activities beyond assassination and sabotage is the more correct view of this definition.
 

A couple of examples of this are found by observing the comments made in the recently released Report of the Joint Inquiry into the attacks of September 11, 2001.The first example concerns the FBI’s establishment of a unit specifically to deal with Islamic terrorist groups called the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU): The Radical Fundamentalist Unit was created in March 1994 to handle incidents related to international radical fundamentalist terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. This unit was also handled other counterintelligence matters and was responsible for the coordination of
extraterritorial intelligence operations and criminal investigations targeted at radical fundamentalist terrorists. In 1999, the FBI recognized the increased threat to the United States posed by Bin Ladin and created the Usama Bin Ladin Unit to handle Al-Qa’ida-related counterterrorism matters.

 

Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, it provides accurate, timely and relevant knowledge about the enemy or potential enemy and the surrounding environment. The primary objective of intelligence is to support decision making by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable level, recognizing that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible. The second intelligence objective assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence (CI). CI includes active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. CI includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion and terrorism. CI directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two intelligence objectives demonstrate that intelligence possesses positive or exploitative and protective elements. It uncovers conditions that can be exploited and simultaneously provides warning of enemy actions.

 

This intelligence provides the basis for our own actions both offensive and defensive.
The principal objective of CI is to assist with protecting friendly forces. CI is the intelligence function concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. CI enhances command security by denying an adversary information that might be used to conduct effective operations against friendly forces and to protect the command by identifying and neutralizing espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism efforts. CI provides critical intelligence support to command force protection efforts by helping identify potential threats, threat capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly operations while helping deceive the adversary as to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Physical security reduces vulnerability. Operation security reduces exposure. Combating terrorism makes us a less lucrative target. CI increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby making a significant contribution to the success of friendly operations. CI also identifies friendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures and assists with implementing appropriate security plans. The integration of intelligence, CI and counter-terrorism operations creates a cohesive unit force protection program.

 

References:

 

Impediments to effective counterintelligence and counterterrorism


 

EXPOSING THE SEAMS: THE IMPETUS FOR REFORMING U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


 

Counterintelligence


 

 

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