The goal of this paper is to define counterintelligence
and describe its role in counterterrorism within the intelligence community. Defining
counterintelligence is somewhat problematic since no US Intelligence Agency can
readily agree upon the definition of it. Counterintelligence can and is defined
in both broad and narrow terms. In narrow terms, it seems that the role
counterintelligence plays in combating terrorism is one that has been the
subject of debate. This is not a new debate either; rather this issue appears
to have surfaced as terrorism both domestic and international became a cause
for greater concern to U.S. at least as early as the late 1960’s. On the other
hand, the definition found in EO12333 could be interpreted more narrowly than
protecting against all terrorist activities generally.
If one considers that the stipulation to protect against
is perhaps not intended to cover all aspects of terrorism, but only sabotage or
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of international terrorist
activities, this means that counterintelligence has a very limited
counter-terrorism responsibility. However, counterintelligence in practice
seems to imply that a broader role to prevent and protect against terrorist activities beyond assassination and
sabotage is the more correct view of this definition.
A couple of examples of this are found by observing the
comments made in the recently released Report of the Joint Inquiry into the
attacks of September 11, 2001.The first example concerns the FBI’s
establishment of a unit specifically to deal with Islamic terrorist groups
called the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU): The Radical Fundamentalist Unit
was created in March 1994 to handle incidents related to international radical
fundamentalist terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. This unit was also
handled other counterintelligence matters and was responsible for the
coordination of
extraterritorial intelligence operations and criminal
investigations targeted at radical fundamentalist terrorists. In 1999, the FBI
recognized the increased threat to the United States posed by Bin Ladin and
created the Usama Bin Ladin Unit to handle Al-Qa’ida-related counterterrorism
matters.
Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First,
it provides accurate, timely and relevant knowledge about the enemy or
potential enemy and the surrounding environment. The primary objective of
intelligence is to support decision making by reducing uncertainty about the
hostile situation to a reasonable level, recognizing that the fog of war
renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible. The second
intelligence objective assists in protecting friendly forces through
counterintelligence (CI). CI includes active and passive measures intended to
deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. CI includes
activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion and terrorism.
CI directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny
intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two
intelligence objectives demonstrate that intelligence possesses positive or
exploitative and protective elements. It uncovers conditions that can be
exploited and simultaneously provides warning of enemy actions.
This intelligence provides the basis for our own actions
both offensive and defensive.
The principal objective of CI is to assist with
protecting friendly forces. CI is the intelligence function concerned with
identifying and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence
capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage,
sabotage, subversion or terrorism. CI enhances command security by denying an
adversary information that might be used to conduct effective operations
against friendly forces and to protect the command by identifying and
neutralizing espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism efforts. CI provides
critical intelligence support to command force protection efforts by helping identify
potential threats, threat capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly
operations while helping deceive the adversary as to friendly capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and intentions. Physical security reduces vulnerability.
Operation security reduces exposure. Combating terrorism makes us a less
lucrative target. CI increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby making a
significant contribution to the success of friendly operations. CI also
identifies friendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures and assists
with implementing appropriate security plans. The integration of intelligence,
CI and counter-terrorism operations creates a cohesive unit force protection
program.
References:
Impediments to effective counterintelligence and
counterterrorism
EXPOSING THE SEAMS: THE IMPETUS FOR REFORMING U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Counterintelligence
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