US strengths, vulnerabilities & where US counterintelligence should be concentrated?

US intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative weaknesses

To effectively identify weaknesses in US intelligence collection efforts, I will use the attack on the US Marines barracks in Beirut, Lebanon as my example.  A vehicle packed with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT penetrated the security perimeter of the US Marine contingent at the Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983, crashed into the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters Building and exploded. The explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 Marines. Following this tragedy, The Secretary of Defense established a five-member commission led by Admiral Robert Long to conduct an independent inquiry of the facts and circumstances surrounding this attack. The commission noted that the Marine forces in Beirut lacked the capability to conduct tactical analysis or investigate active threats. Admiral Long’s Commission report stated, “Seldom did the US have a mechanism at its disposal which would allow a follow up on these leads and a further refinement of the information into intelligence which served for other than warnings.” In conclusion, the Commission determined that although the Marine Corps commander received numerous terrorist threat warnings before October 23, 1983, he was not provided the intelligence he needed to counter this attack. The Beirut attack clearly showed that terrorism posed a significant threat to the US and its military personnel. The inability to detect and neutralize this attack clearly demonstrated that the US Marines ability to conduct intelligence collection and analysis efforts was ineffective.

 

US strengths and capabilities

 

From what I have gathered the US strengths lie in its ability to share information with other agencies.  Increasing cooperation with other members of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community will keep the security at our borders high. The dividing line between the responsibilities of intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies must remain clear at all times. The CIA handles everything that involves foreign intelligence outside the US. The FBI and the DEA handle the law enforcement within the US. Cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement can produce fantastic success; an example of this was the arrest of the leaders of the Cali drug cartel in 1995.

 

 

This cooperation has yet to be as effective, extensive and routine as it needs to be. We should not waste valuable time worrying about bureaucratic rivalries that go back to the days of J. Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles; we have in place the interagency mechanisms that we need to address criminal and terroristic threats adequately and they should be used often. It’s time for a new approach, a new division of responsibility that realistically reflects the pattern of international activity that exists today in terrorism, crime and drugs. The Intelligence Community must learn that in these areas, the law enforcement community -- the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency and US Customs are the customers for intelligence, just as the Departments of State and Defense are the customers for intelligence in the national security arena. Intelligence and law enforcement professionals need to develop new procedures that will result in more effective cooperation. For example, intelligence and law enforcement must modify some of their most strongly held beliefs about not sharing information about their sources with each other. This does not mean that intelligence agencies will spy on US citizens. Collection activities will not infringe on the rights of US citizens. Nor will CIA or other intelligence agencies take on any law enforcement duties.  The sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement will improve the country's performance in curbing international crime, drugs and terrorism.

 

Where the US should concentrate its efforts currently

 

It is my opinion that the US should focus its effort more in the area of counterintelligence. I say this because according to the strategic threats report released by the CIA, foreign powers have seized the initiative and moved their operations to US soil, where our institutions are not constituted to work against growing foreign intelligence networks embedded within American society. In this situation, CI investigations may result in prosecutions for espionage or related offenses, demarches, or the expulsion of diplomatic personnel for activities inconsistent with their status. With the rare exception, their disposition is decided on the merits of each case at hand and not as part of a larger effort to counter the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target. As a result, I fear we have neither an adequate understanding of the foreign presence and intelligence operations in the United States nor an appreciation of their broader effects on US national security. Former deputy defense secretary John Hamre described the challenge plainly,” The goal should not be to catch the spy after he’s gotten into the country; we’ve got to stop him from entering in the first place. Perhaps we have been coming at the problem from the wrong end. Why wait until foreign intelligence activities show up on US soil, with all the operational advantages of proximity and cover that our rich society provides? There is another way. US counterintelligence could seize the strategic initiative and begin by working the target abroad with the purpose of selectively degrading the hostile foreign intelligence service and its ability to work against us. This is the central objective of strategic counterintelligence. By working the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target globally, US counterintelligence should be able to leverage insights into adversary activities and vulnerabilities to direct CI operations to maximum effect. At home, this means that the operational and analytic focus of US counterintelligence would need to be transformed from its case-driven approach to one that includes strategic assessments of adversary presence, capabilities, and intentions. This in my opinion would drive operations to neutralize the inevitable penetrations of our government and protect national security secrets and other valuable information.

 

References:

 

Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/strategic-counterintelligence.html

 

The Future of US Intelligence: Charting a Course for Change

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1995/dci_speech_91295.html

 

Identifying Threats: Improving Intelligence & Counter Intelligence Support to Force Protection

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/02-059.pdf